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criminal trial and the civil proof respectively, once the context has been provided by discussion
of the detailed rules. Much of the remaining material in the book has been reorganised into
what the author believes (with justification) to be a more logical structure, so that the book is
laid out in a way which is significantly different from the work it supplants.
Proper account is taken of the fact that evidence in practice is much more bound up
with the presentation of facts, and the way that may be done, than with the actual rules of
evidence. The book is also enriched by the fact that the subject is considered against the wider
background. The philosophical and political debates surrounding particular issues, relevant
policy statements and sociological studies are skilfully woven into the fabric of the work.
Particular pieces of legislation are not merely explained, but empirical analysis is accessed in
order to indicate how (or if) the rules actually work in practice. The author has, of course,
long been a pioneer in examining how science in general and particularly the behavioural
sciences interact with the law, and as might be expected, this is a notable strength of certain
parts of the work. The human rights dimension of this area of the law also receives enhanced
prominence.
At the same time, this remains a text on the law of evidence, and in this respect it retains
the strengths of the former work. So anyone who wishes to know which categories of witness
are competent and/or compellable in a criminal trial, or what section 280(9) of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 means, can still find the answer here. Equally, while the
description of the wider context helps the reader make better sense of the rules, it is not
necessary to consider that aspect of the work in order to understand the account of the law.
It is also worth noting that by making the subject come alive the author makes the book a
pleasure to read. Despite the learning which has obviously been invested in the work, nobody
will find it difficult to understand. It is an ideal student text, which will also prove of great
value to practitioners and indeed to anyone interested in the law of evidence. Many though the
virtues of the previous work were, they are easily surpassed by this wonderful contribution to
the literature on the subject.
Fraser Davidson
University of Stirling
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R A Duff, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW
Oxford: Hart (www.hartpub.co.uk), 2007. xx + 322 pp. ISBN 9781841137537. £45.
Answering for Crime was written by Antony Duff during a Leverhulme Major Research
Fellowship. Its aim is relatively modest – not to produce a theory of criminal law but instead to
“sketch the normative and logical structures that any such theory should embody” (7). In this
and more, it succeeds admirably.
The book’s starting point is the distinction between criminal responsibility and criminal
liability. For Duff, questions of criminal responsibility – “who is (or should be) criminally
responsible for what and to whom?” (15) – arise logically prior to questions of criminal liability.
This is a simple but crucial distinction – one that, as Duff himself states, is often neglected
by theorists – and it provides the foundation for the rest of the book. The focus of the first two
thirds of the book is primarily on responsibility, addressing topics including the relational nature
of responsibility (to whom we are responsible and in what role?), what we can properly be held
responsible for, and the legal and moral bars to trial. Later chapters consider criminal liability,
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discussing the distinction between offences and defences, strict liability and the classification
and structure of defences.
The book is full of insights into a range of important issues. In a book that is of consistently
high quality, it is difficult to select particular parts for special praise but the following
discussions certainly engaged this reviewer’s attention. In chapter 5, Duff suggests that, rather
than the traditional act requirement found in most criminal law textbooks, the law might
more usefully operate with an action requirement – “an actualisation of the results of practical
reasoning in a way that has an impact on the world” (107) – and uses this concept to develop
an illuminating analysis of when we might legitimately impose criminal responsibility in the
context of possession offences (114-115).
Chapter 8 focuses on pleas in bar of trial (as distinct from defences) and proposes a valuable
typology before offering an analysis of some of the more complex pleas, such as entrapment.
Duff has been one of a small minority of scholars to devote attention to pleas in bar and this
chapter, which draws on existing work but also covers new ground, is a valuable contribution
to a neglected area.
Chapter 10 addresses the distinction between offences and defences. For Duff, offences
“define presumptive public wrongs” (217), “conduct that we have, in the law’s eyes, reason not
to engage in” (218). Defences “[do] not deny responsibility for the offence charged, but [claim]
that further relevant factors should block liability” (263). He illustrates the distinction using the
examples of a lack of consent to sexual intercourse (part of the offence definition of rape) and
self-defence (a defence). Given the former example, it would be interesting to learn what Duff
makes of the paper by Dempsey and Herring in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (2007)
467 – published after the text of Answering for Crime would have been finalised – in which the
authors argue that sexual penetration per se is a wrong that requires justification.
Chapter 11 addresses the structure of defences, including the issue of putative
justification – the individual who acts on a mistaken (but reasonable) belief in circumstances
that, if true, would justify her actions. The example used in the book is of someone who
smashes a window to gain entry to a house in which she saw a friend with heart problems lying
unresponsive on the floor. It turns out that the friend had fallen asleep with his hearing aid
turned off while trying out a new relaxation technique. The question of whether such conduct
is best classified as “justified” or “excused” has attracted an enormous amount of discussion
among criminal law theorists. Duff suggests that her action be described as neither justified nor
excused but as “warranted” (276). As one who has contributed to the debate, I am left feeling
rather foolish that such an obvious (with the benefit of hindsight) analysis did not present itself
to me.
Aside from these major contributions, the book is full of passing but no less valuable
insights made possible by the author’s extensive experience and knowledge. For example, Duff
succinctly identifies exactly why we should hesitate to embrace restorative justice as a principle
of the criminal law (88) and captures perfectly the arguments against criminalising merely
preparatory acts (160), being able to draw here on his earlier work on attempted crime.
If one was to air a slight disappointment, it would be that the majority of the illustrations
come from the law of England and Wales. We are lucky in Scotland to have a criminal law
theorist of the stature of Antony Duff working in our jurisdiction, but despite his geographical
location, the table of cases contains only six from Scotland (compared to around 80 from
England and Wales and 20 from the USA). It may be that the use of English examples was
necessary to maximise the appeal of the book but if this is the reason, it is a shame.
This is, however, a very minor quibble: Answering for Crime is an important yet highly
readable book. It might be questioned whether another monograph on criminal responsibility
is needed, with recent works having been published by Victor Tadros (reviewed at (2007)
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11 EdinLR 138) and John Gardner among others. If one had any doubts about this, they
are dispelled by reading this book, which contains many new insights and which, equally
importantly, tackles complex issues of criminal law theory with a rare clarity. Engaging with
the field of criminal law theory can sometimes leave those who are not legal theorists feeling
bewildered and slightly inadequate. But this book proves that complex issues can be discussed
at an elevated level without making them incomprehensible to all but a small group of
dedicated theorists. Indeed, the book should be of interest not just to academics but also to
students and even – unusually for a book in this field – practitioners and policy makers.
Fiona Leverick
University of Glasgow
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Anthony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros, THE TRIAL ON
TRIAL vol 3: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
Oxford: Hart Publishing (www.hartpub.co.uk), 2007. vi + 344 pp. ISBN 9781841136981. £40.
This is an excellent and provocative book, which should be read by everyone with an interest in
criminal justice, although I am slightly sceptical about the authors’ thesis. It is the product of
a series of workshops which have already led to the publication of two collections of essays,
The Trial on Trial vol 1: Truth and Due Process and The Trial on Trial vol 2: Judgement
and Calling to Account. These were edited by the authors of the present work and contain
contributions by scholars from a variety of academic backgrounds. Here I must declare an
interest as a participant in all of the workshops and author of an essay in the first volume.
It is fair to say that at the outset, while I thought that this was an extremely interesting and
worthwhile project, I was rather dubious about the authors’ claims. While some of my doubts
persist, this third volume, which sets out the authors’ own views and stands alone as a coherent
and self-contained work, presents a much more impressive and convincing argument than I
had originally anticipated.
Put briefly, the authors argue that it is time to develop a normative theory of the criminal
trial in order both to defend it against current attacks (for instance, increases in plea bargaining
and attempts to “rebalance” it in favour of the victim) and also to provide a moral framework
against which the current institution can be evaluated and improved. It is emphasised at the
outset that the theory was developed through a study of the English adversarial trial and that
it cannot simply be “transplanted” (11) into other systems, particularly those of an inquisitorial
nature: thus the book avoids the ethnocentricity to be found in, for instance, R Burns, A Theory
of the Trial (1999). It is fair to say however that the authors’ thesis is generally applicable to
most forms of the Anglo-American adversarial trial and is thus directly relevant to the Scottish
experience.
In essence, the authors’ theory is that the trial is – or should be – about communication,
primarily calling the accused to account on behalf of the polity for his wrongful behaviour.
As such, they reject the traditional “instrumentalist” (64) conception of the trial which sees
the process as geared towards discovering the truth or ensuring the accuracy of the verdict,
subject to external constraints, such as the need to respect the accused’s civil rights and the
requirement for the polity to behave in a moral fashion. The argument is that these are not
“free-floating rights” (238) which hamper the pursuit of truth but that they are integral to a
normative theory of the trial (62-70). Calling the accused to account at a criminal trial involves
